Ideas from 'Emotivism' by David O. Brink [1995], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy' (ed/tr Audi,Robert) [CUP 1995,0-521-48328-x]].
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
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2850
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How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it?
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2848
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Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement
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2851
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Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements
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2853
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Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes
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2852
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Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless
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2849
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Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference
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